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espite the delay of this issue, we welcome the readers to a wide 
selection of philosophical topics that extend themselves through age 
and genre.   This issue marks the success of KRITIKE in its second 
y e a r — a n d ,  s o  f a r  s o  g o o d !   W e  o w e  this success to our contributors and 
readers, and we are deeply grateful to them.   The growing number of essays 
we are receiving is testament to the rhizomatic growth of the journal—the 
varieties of topics collected in this issue also speak of the continuous growth of 
the journal.   We are happy to present fourteen philosophical pieces from 
different theoretical persuasions, ranging from ancient Greek philosophy, 
social and critical theory, philosophical anthropology, psychoanalysis, analytic 
philosophy, and phenomenology. 
We open the issue with our Featured Essay.   The Editorial Board is 
once more thankful to Fr. Ranhilio Callangan Aquino for granting us 
permission to feature his essay entitled “The Dialectics of Power, Rights, and 
Responsibility.”  In this essay, Fr. Aquino discusses the importance of rights in 
the context of entitlement by drawing on Paul Ricouer and Jürgen Habermas.  
Fr. Aquino begins his discussion of rights as a form of entitlement towards a 
“good life,” this entitlement is conditioned by the social dimension within 
which man is situated, man who lives in a life that is lacking by itself.  It is only 
through others that man is able to recognize this entitlement, and with that we 
understand that right becomes a power that may either be beneficial or 
detrimental to the “good life” with Other(s).  Thus, power must be delegated 
to someone who is solicitous and sympathetic to the needs of the Other, while 
at the same time be able to deal with the plurality that characterizes the 
differences among individuals.  A just institution, then, is characterized by 
having this power to unite the people, despite the differences in perspectives 
with regard to the goal of living a good life; this is made possible through the 
thorough negotiations, made possible through an open flow of information 
and communication. 
The first article is written by Jeffry V. Ocay entitled “Eroticizing Marx, 
Revolutionizing Freud: Marcuse’s Psychoanalytic Turn.”  Ocay offers a critical 
perspective on Marcuse’s take on Marx’s notion of capitalism.  Freud points 
out that eros is closely related to thanatos, and in this relationship one sees that 
there is a need to suppress desires in order to preserve life.  Ananke, or scarcity, 
holds the key in the suppression of these desires through sublimination.  With 
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the dawn of capitalism, work has been seen as an unpleasant necessity, to 
which desires are held back in order to be satisfied later through consumption.  
Ocay points out that through Marcuse, one is able to justify the Marxist 
critique of capitalism with repressive desublimination, when work becomes a 
pleasant expression of the Id’s desire, society can move away from a repressive 
and alienated form of labor.   
Robert Montaña’s essay entitled “The Gewirthian Principle of Generic 
Consistency as a Foundation for Human Fulfillment: Unveiling a Rational Path 
for Moral and Political Hope,” aims at exploring the possibility of political 
harmony through the use of Gewirth’s “Principle of Generic Consistency” 
(PGC), as a way of resolving political conflicts amidst a pluralism.  Montaña’s 
reading of Gewirth opens up the possibility of moving beyond the Kantian 
categorical imperative by tracing the actions committed by rational agents and 
finding the level of consistency seen in its acceptance or rejection from society.  
Through the PGC, Gewirth is able to derive the structure and nature of human 
agents and is able to educe a moral principle that is based on generic rights that 
are agreed and acted upon by its agents.  Montaña opts that through this, a 
supreme moral principle can be educed which would promote human 
fulfillment and political harmony. 
In contradistinction to the concreteness of the normative life of 
human beings—emphasized by Aquino, Ocay, and Montaña—Jove Jim S. 
Aguas, in his essay “The Notions of the Human Person and Human Dignity in 
Aquinas and Wojtyla,” assumes that the human person is not simply a being 
created by society.  Aguas draws on the Christian- and Thomisitic tradition in 
order to explain the essentialist notion of personhood embedded in Wojtyla’s 
phenomenology.  Personhood, according to this essentialist view, is first rooted 
in its metaphysical hylemorphic essence as a being with substance and form 
that is innately rational and free.  Ultimately, human dignity is afforded not 
only through the divine nature embedded in man’s supposed resemblance to 
god.  Through this, man as an agent of his own free will and reason or sui juris, 
man’s own intrinsic rational faculty for decision making is able to lead an 
existence that is closer to the Imago Dei.  Aguas further asserts human dignity 
on the side of Wojtyla’s phenomenology—man is elevated to a higher 
valuation based on the assumption that man is an alteri incommunicabilis, a unique 
being of singularity that is prior to society which is why he also argues that 
societies must never treat the individual as a means towards an end, but rather 
as the very purpose for any society’s existence. 
Meanwhile, Wendy C. Hamblet and Adam Barkman present a 
retrospective look at ancient philosophies.  Hamblet’s “Order: Divine Principle 
of Excellence or Perfect Death for Living Beings” gives us an account of the 
possible consequences of logos as a principle and structure of order and 
balance in Ancient Greece.  Through Georges Bataille, Hamblet opines that 
the over-abundance or the deprivation of logos can lead to two social systems, 
the  monocephalic state and the acephalic  state, the former represents the 
abundance of logos while the latter represents the lack of logos.  Despite the 
preference of Western civilizations to live in a monocephalic state, Hamblet  
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points out that this divine desire for perfection has often led to undesirable 
consequences (i.e. fascism), and thus one should always try to find the right 
balance between the two.  In his essay “Negative Happiness,” Barkman 
compares two philosophical traditions that are peculiarly known for their 
negative conceptions of happiness.  Buddhism and Epicurianism share a 
common perspective on happiness in so far as both philosophies conceive 
happiness in the sense that happiness is only made possible through the denial 
of sources of pain and suffering.  Barkman points out that both philosophical 
perspectives are incapable of giving a satisfactory account of happiness since 
they deny that substantiality is a positive factor; both perspectives also deny 
that happiness has an intrinsic value. 
  Included in this issue are two interesting accounts on the philosophical 
problem of love, one from the perspective of Freudian psychoanalysis and the 
other draws on Plato’s dialogues.  Amo Sulaiman’s “Plato: White and Non-
white Love” provides us a comprehensive understanding of the states of love 
in Plato’s dialogues.  In this essay, Sulaiman distinguishes two important 
differences in the state of love, specifically that of being in love and falling in 
love.  In this distinction, Sulaiman refers to Socrates’ allusion to the black and 
white horses; on one hand, the white horse signifies the state of being out of 
love, it is the state wherein one is able to transcend the feeling of love to the 
point where one admires the beauty of the beloved and in turn represses one’s 
desire for carnal reciprocation.  On the other hand, the dark horse symbolizes 
the erotic passion that the lover feels in the state of loving, like this dark horse, 
the lover is unable to control its emotions towards its object of affection.  The 
horse no longer heeds the call of the whip and continues to pursue the 
satisfaction of its desire as if it were a child fighting off an itch in its new tooth.  
Sulaiman later on points out that these varying states of love will give us an 
inkling of how love is transcended in the dialogues of Plato, thereby addressing 
certain criticisms against Plato’s view on love.  Meanwhile, from a different 
perspective, Kathleen O’Dwyer’s “Was Freud, at Heart, a Realistic Romantic?” 
explores Freud’s reflection on the ambiguous topic of love.  Love, according to 
Freud, is a necessity for civilization—its lost, deficiency, distortion, and 
experience lead either to neuroses or to the well being of one’s psyche.  Freud’s 
study of love through psychoanalysis compels us to question certain common 
presuppositions about its positive and negative effects on the human subject, 
who is actually seen as an ambivalent, imperfect, and erratic being whose 
emptiness continues to long for the satiation offered by love. 
   Both James Magrini- and Vigilio Rivas’ essays discuss an important 
aspect of Nietzschean scholarship: Martin Heidegger’s famous reading of 
Nietzsche.  On the one hand, Magrini’s “Truth, Art, and the “New 
Sensuousness”: Understanding Heidegger’s Metaphysical Reading of 
Nietzsche” takes a critical look into Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean 
metaphysics in the context of art and finds certain discrepancies in Heidegger’s 
texts.  Heidegger’s claim is that Nietzsche has had some difficulty in discussing 
the problem of truth, being, and becoming in terms of how the Western 
tradition of philosophy has understood it.  In the context of art, Magrini re- 
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traces the path that Heidegger took in understanding Nietzsche’s notion of 
nihilism and finds that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is actually an attempt 
to elevate the latter as a timely philosophical force whose thought moves away 
from the rote and dogmatic tradition of Western philosophy.  Magrini is also 
able to point out that Heidegger’s reading moves through the usual rational and 
structured philosophy via a sensuous use of metaphors that is much closer to 
life, which is a noticeable change in the writing style of Heidegger from his 
Nachlass lectures and his posthumous work the Beiträge zur Philosophie.  Despite 
some misgivings, Magrini lauds Heidegger’s work as a strict close reading of 
Nietzsche that brings out the best of the thinker’s radical thoughts.  On the 
other hand, Rivas’ reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger in “The Death of God 
and Philosophy’s Untimely Gospel,” takes a rather interesting view of the 
similarities and differences of the two philosophers from the standpoint of 
their critique of nihilism.  Rivas takes us to the world of Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra and Heidegger’s Da-sein in their discovery and revelation of the 
godless and nihilistic trappings of their own time only to assert that in the end 
the untimeliness of their thoughts could serve to reveal a new philosophical 
sensibility.   
  The Articles section comes to a close with Melanie Rosen- and Ulysses 
T. Araña’s essays on epistemology and analytic philosophy.  Rosen’s “A 
Pragmatic Justification of Deduction” tackles the issue of the problem of 
deduction and induction in Hans Reichenbach’s justification of induction.   
Deduction according to Rosen is as necessary induction in the context of 
everyday life.  Rosen criticizes Carroll and Haack’s argument that deduction is 
in need of justification in as much as induction needs to prove the stability of 
its relationship with the principle of uniformity of nature.  Rosen further argues 
that we can also find induction just as problematic as deduction; however, we 
can find that with deduction, truth is preserved better when it utilizes induction 
as its basis for vindication.  Araña’s piece “Yes to Realism! No to Non-
naturalism!” offers a critique of Russ Shafer-Landau, a noted non-naturalist.  
The essay is an attempt to square off the naturalist arguments of Frank Jackson 
to that of the non-naturalist claims of Shafer-Landau.  This is done by an 
evaluation of the metaphysical plausibility of the non-naturalist view of moral 
properties.  Araña claims that naturalists, like Jackson, are at a better position 
to be more consistent with the logical platitude referred to as “supervenience.” 
  The last two pieces included in this issue, by Frederic Will and F.P.A. 
Demeterio respectively, are categorized under the Denkbilder section.  The term 
Denkbild (“thinking image,” “image of reflection,” or “thought-image”) was 
used by the German cultural critique Walter Benjamin to refer to a style of 
writing that defies the traditional systematic prose of philosophical writing.  A 
Denkbild illustrates the material world and its objects in short, yet emphatic and 
deeply aesthetic, prose, akin to the brushwork of a painter.  The Denkbild is a 
textual performance that eludes linguistic representation, yet could be the 
source of critical insight.  We, therefore, use the Denkbild metaphor to describe 
contributions which elude the formal style of most academic essays (e.g., 
philosophical aphorisms, poems, and short philosophical novels).  Will’s  
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“Reading and Accounts” is an interestingly unconventional reflection on the 
act of reading and how well we understand the act of reading to be able for us 
to give an “account” of what reading is exactly.  Will intimates that when we 
are asked “How do you read?,” we often answer the question by describing our 
ontic actions or gestures, but take it for granted that the “how” pertains to 
what actually occurs in the act of reading.  Is it possible to give an account of 
reading, that is, to understand the very act of reading apart from the very 
experience of reading itself?  This seems to be Will’s formidable question.  The 
essay naturally is open-ended.  Finally, in the philosophical novel “Dreaming 
with a Hammer: On Critical Theory in the Philippines,” Demeterio chronicles, 
in semi-flashback fashion, the life experiences of Peter Mirano, an unsung 
college instructor but who is deeply respected by some of his students.   
Mirano’s choice of using critical theory as a pedagogical device in his literature 
classes, a practice that worries the school’s administrators, is shaped by his 
increasing sensitivity to the social and political realities in the Philippines as a 
former student activist, as a victim of political violence, and as a perpetual 
social deviant on account of his sexuality.  Demeterio offers us a political 
manifesto—in the spirit of Camus, Sartre, and Sionil Jose—that captures some 
of the basic concerns of contemporary critical theory (e.g., the critique of the 
socio-political sphere and gender/queer sensitivity) via powerful imageries that 
remain true to the Filipino Weltanschauung. 
The Editorial Board would like to thank the various referees who 
graciously helped in the course of completing this issue.  